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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

ROGELIO MONTES and MATEO
ARTEAGA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF YAKIMA, MICAH
CAWLEY, in his official capacity as
Mayor of Yakima, and MAUREEN
ADKISON, SARA BRISTOL,
KATHY COFFEY, RICK ENSEY,
DAVE ETTL, and BILL LOVER, in
their official capacity as members of
the Yakima City Council,

Defendants.

NO. 12-CV-3108 TOR

**MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED
REMEDIAL PLAN AND FINAL
INJUNCTION**

MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PLS.'
PROPOSED REMEDIAL PLAN AND
INJUNCTION

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Court's Summary Judgment Order definitively found that City Council elections in Yakima "are not 'equally open to participation' by Latino voters," in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"). ECF No. 108 ("Op.") at 65 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)). The Court's remedy for the violation should be no less definitive—to fully and completely stamp out minority vote dilution in Yakima and provide Latinos an effective opportunity to elect their candidates of choice, now and in the future.

Defendants' proposed remedy falls woefully short of this standard. To be sure, courts often defer to local legislative bodies to remedy a Section 2 violation, but a legislature does not have carte blanche, and whatever remedy is ultimately adopted must, at a minimum, provide a complete remedy for the violation. A defendant's proposed remedial plan merits no deference where it conflicts with state and federal law. Defendants' plan does both. Not only does it contravene Washington law in its proposed election scheme for Mayor and Assistant Mayor, it perpetuates the Section 2 violation by maintaining two at-large positions and creating only five rather than seven single-member districts. Plaintiffs' Illustrative Plan 1, by contrast, is familiar to the parties and the Court, abides by the strict rules governing court-ordered plans, and, most importantly, provides a full and fair remedy to the City's Section 2 violation.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reject Defendants' proposal and adopt Plaintiffs' proposed remedy and injunction.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered the parties to meet and confer in an effort to agree upon a joint proposed injunction and a joint proposed remedial districting plan. Op. at 66-67. The Court further ordered that in the event the parties are unable to agree on the terms of an injunction or remedial districting plan, they may submit separate proposals. *Id.* at 66.

On September 11, 2014, the parties discussed the broad contours of their proposals over the telephone. Declaration of Abha Khanna in Support of. Mot. for Entry of Pls.' Proposed Remedial Plan and Final Injunction (Oct. 3, 2014) ("Khanna Decl.") ¶ 1. On September 23, Defendants provided their proposed remedial plan to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs informed Defendants that they intend to propose Mr. Cooper's Illustrative Plan 1 as a remedy. *Id.* ¶ 2. The parties conferred in-person two days later, but they were unable to agree on the terms of a proposed remedial plan or injunction. Accordingly, the parties agreed to submit separate proposals to the Court. *Id.* ¶ 3.

III. ARGUMENT

Where a Section 2 violation has been established, "[t]he court should exercise its traditional equitable powers to fashion the relief so that it *completely* remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and *fully* provides equal opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.'" *Dillard v. Crenshaw Cnty., Ala.*, 831 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208); *see also Dillard v. Crenshaw Cnty., Ala.*, 649 F. Supp. 289, 293 (M.D. Ala. 1986) ("Without

1 question, the remedy fashioned by a court should reach the nature and scope of
 2 the violation found.”) (citing *Upam v. Seamon*, 456 U.S. 37 (1982)). As the
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 4 Supreme Court has stated:
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 7 A district court has not merely the power but the duty
 8 to render a decree which will so far as possible
 9 eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as
 10 well as bar like discrimination in the future. Once a
 11 right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
 12 district court’s equitable powers to remedy past
 13 wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are
 14 inherent in equitable remedies.
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18 *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149, 183-84 (1987) (internal quotation
 19 marks and citations omitted), *quoted in Buchanan v. City of Jackson, Tenn.*,
 20 683 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (W.D. Tenn. 1988).
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24 Thus, the Court’s primary function is to fashion an effective remedy. In
 25 doing this, courts should “afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to
 26 meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure.” *Wise v.*
 27 *Lipscomb*, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978). But courts must not “defer blindly to
 28 legislative prerogative” in deciding whether a legislature’s proposed plan is
 29 acceptable under the VRA. *Buchanan*, 683 F. Supp. at 1541. Specifically,
 30 “[t]he district court need not defer to a state-proposed remedial plan . . . if the
 31 plan does not completely remedy the violation or if the plan itself violates
 32 section 2 of the Act.” *Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5*, 126 F.3d 1038,
 33 1040 (8th Cir. 1997).
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44 Defendants’ proposal here not only fails to fully cure the Section 2
 45 violation, it perpetuates it. Given Defendants’ failure to devise an effective
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1 legal remedy, the Court should adopt Plaintiffs' Illustrative Plan 1, which fully
 2 addresses the Section 2 violation found by the Court and provides Latinos a
 3 full and fair opportunity to participate in the political process in Yakima.
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 7 **A. The Court Should Reject Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan.**
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9 The current City of Yakima election system employs a hybrid at-large
 10 system, in which four City Council members are nominated from residency
 11 districts, three are nominated citywide, and all are ultimately elected at-large.
 12 The Court struck down that system as a violation of Section 2, noting that
 13 pervasive racially polarized voting has resulted in the "non-Latino majority in
 14 Yakima routinely suffocat[ing] the voting preferences of the Latino
 15 community." Op. at 48. Compounded by the "depressed socio-economic
 16 conditions" of Latinos, evidence of historical discrimination, and the reality
 17 that not a single Latino candidate has been elected to the City Council "in the
 18 37 years that the current voting system has been in place," *id.* at 53, 62-63, the
 19 Court found that Yakima's electoral system is "not 'equally open to
 20 participation' by Latino voters," *id.* at 65 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
 21

22 Defendants' proposed remedial plan would simply substitute the City's
 23 current hybrid at-large system with a new hybrid at-large system. Defendants
 24 propose a plan which would create five single-member districts and maintain
 25 two at-large City Council seats. Moreover, according to Defendants' proposal,
 26 the two at-large members will be automatically designated the Mayor and
 27 Assistant Mayor—the two highest-ranking elected City officials.
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1 This electoral scheme is fundamentally at odds with this Court's
 2 Summary Judgment Order, Section 2 of the VRA, and Washington law. The
 3 Court should accordingly reject Defendants' proposal.
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 7 **1. Defendants' Proposal for Two At-Large Positions Violates**
 8 **Both Washington Law and the VRA.**
 9

10 As an initial matter, Defendants' proposal merits no deference from this
 11 Court because it conflicts with state law. In a council-manager system such as
 12 that used by the City, Washington law does not permit the election of a city's
 13 mayor by a vote of city residents, at-large or otherwise. Rather, in a council-
 14 manager system, city council members "shall choose a chair from among their
 15 number who shall have the title of mayor." RCW 35.18.190. The same goes
 16 for a "mayor pro tempore." RCW 35.18.210.¹ Defendants' failure to propose
 17 a remedy that complies with state law eliminates any claim to deference to
 18 which their proposal might have been entitled. *See Large v. Fremont Cnty.,*
 19 *Wyo.*, 670 F.3d 1133, 1148 (10th Cir. 2012) ("[W]here a local governmental
 20 body's proposed remedial plan for an adjudged Section 2 violation
 21 unnecessarily conflicts with state law, it is not a legislative plan entitled to
 22 deference by the federal courts."). As a result, Defendants' proposed plan is
 23 not a lawful exercise of legislative power, and the Court should implement a
 24 court-ordered remedy. *Id.* at 1139.
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 45 ¹ If Defendants wish to change the system by which the Mayor is elected, they
 46 must place a proposition before the voters of the city. RCW 35A.13.033.
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1 In any event, even if Defendants' proposal did comport with state law,
 2 the Court should reject it because it does not fully remedy the Section 2
 3 violation. Defendants' insistence on maintaining two at-large seats preserves
 4 the very minority vote dilution that requires remediation. Where, as here,
 5 "there can be no serious dispute that voting in Yakima is racially polarized,"
 6 Op. at 54, the creation of a system in which two out of seven elected officials
 7 are elected citywide strongly suggests that those seats will be off limits to
 8 Latino voters. The racialized voting patterns the Court observed just six weeks
 9 ago have not magically disappeared; rather, the state of affairs described in the
 10 Court's Summary Judgment Order mandates a remedy that eliminates at-large
 11 elections that "routinely suffocate[] the voting preferences of the Latino
 12 minority." Op. at 48.

13 Courts routinely reject hybrid plans as remedies for voting rights
 14 violations, even where such plans contain one or more majority-minority
 15 districts. In *Buchanan*, 683 F. Supp. 1537, after finding that at-large elections
 16 for the city commission violated Section 2, the court rejected defendants'
 17 proposed 6-3 hybrid plan (6 single-member districts and 3 at-large seats). With
 18 regard to the at-large seats, the court concluded that "racially polarized voting
 19 would still take place," and minority "candidates would face the same
 20 difficulties in being elected as under the current system." *Id.* at 1543, 1544;
 21 *see also id.* at 1545 ("The plan proposed by the defendants to remedy the
 22 present § 2 violation is itself violative of § 2 of the [VRA].").

23 Similarly, in *Harvell*, 126 F.3d at 1040, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
 24 district court's rejection of the 5-2 plan proposed by a school district as a

1 remedy for a Section 2 violation because “[t]he inability of black voters to
 2 affect the at-large elections under the 5-2 plan is no different from what it was
 3 under the previous electoral scheme.” In *United States v. Dallas County*
 4 *Commission*, 850 F.2d 1433, 1438-39 (11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit
 5 rejected a 4-1 hybrid plan because “many of the concerns which prompted” the
 6 finding of a Section 2 violation four years earlier “continue to exist.” The
 7 court found that at-large election of the fifth member of the school board
 8 “perpetuates rather than ameliorates the inequities which have resulted in an
 9 abridgement of Dallas County’s black citizens’ access to the political process.”
 10 *Id.* at 1440. Other courts are in accord. *See, e.g., United States v. Osceola*
 11 *Cnty., Fla.*, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1256 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (“Hispanics in
 12 Osceola County have no reasonable opportunity to elect members in an at-large
 13 election. Therefore, given the high degree of historically polarized voting, the
 14 extra two at large seats are completely out of the reach of the Hispanic
 15 community.”); *LULAC Council No. 4836 v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 648 F.
 16 Supp. 596, 609 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (“[A]ny at-large election in MISD violates
 17 the provisions of . . . the [VRA].”).

18 Worse still, Defendants would reserve for the at-large councilmembers
 19 the most powerful elected positions in the City: Mayor and Assistant Mayor.
 20 This system not only fails as a matter of law, it fails as a matter of principle:
 21 Defendants’ attempt to cabin Latino voting strength to a single district, while
 22 preserving an at-large system for the highest offices in the City, hardly reflects
 23 a concerted effort to rectify the Section 2 violation under which Latino voters
 24 have long suffered. Courts have rejected similar proposals. In *Dillard*, 649 F.

1 Supp. at 296, the district court rejected a hybrid plan in which a commission
 2 chairperson would be elected at-large: “An at-large elected member would
 3 increase the voting membership of the county commission, would participate
 4 as a member of the commission, and would exercise enhanced powers enjoyed
 5 by no other member of the commission. To that extent, the members elected
 6 by a racially fair district election method would have their voting strength and
 7 influence diluted.” The court found that to adopt the at-large chairperson
 8 feature “in the face of the present social, political, and economic condition”
 9 would in effect authorize an election system “containing a public office
 10 completely beyond the reach of the counties’ black citizens and thus reserved
 11 exclusively for the white citizens,” an “intolerable [result] under section 2”
 12 where alternative electoral schemes are available. *Id.* at 297; *see also*
 13 *Buchanan*, 683 F. Supp. at 1542-43 (striking down a proposed remedy where
 14 “the most important members of the Board, the Administrative Commissioners,
 15 would still be elected at-large by the entire City”).

16
 17 In sum, because Defendants’ plan disregards state law, it comes cloaked
 18 with no political legitimacy and merits no deference. Regardless, Defendants’
 19 proposal that the two highest offices in the City be elected at-large fails to
 20 provide a complete remedy to the Section 2 violation—it perpetuates the
 21 violation. Accordingly, the Court should reject Defendants’ proposal.

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2. Defendants’ Modifications to the Previous At-Large Election System Do Not Cure the Problem.

To be sure, Defendants no longer propose at-large elections that turn on the “place system,” in which candidates run for a specific position on the City

1 Council in a top-two contest. Instead, Defendants' proposal envisions that the
 2 two at-large positions will be elected from a single ballot with two winners,
 3 neither of whom are required to receive a majority of the votes. But while this
 4 is an improvement on the existing system, it does not fully address the barriers
 5 Latinos face in at-large, citywide elections.

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 10 As Dr. Engstrom explains, the opportunity provided to minority voters in
 11 at-large systems such as the one proposed by Defendants is commonly
 12 measured by the "threshold of exclusion," or the percentage of voters the
 13 minority group must exceed in order to elect its candidate of choice regardless
 14 of how the majority votes. Khanna Decl., Ex. 2 ¶ 5. This threshold is based on
 15 a number of theoretical assumptions, including that every eligible Latino voter
 16 turns out on Election Day and casts a vote for the same candidate, and that the
 17 non-Latino voters spread their votes evenly across two other candidates. *See*
 18 *id.* Minority voting opportunities increase the more limited each person's vote
 19 is compared to the number of seats to be elected. *Id.* ¶ 4; *see also* Op. at 58
 20 ("[T]he fewer the number of candidates, the more difficult it becomes for the
 21 minority's chosen candidate to win the race outright.").

22
 23 Under Defendants' proposed system, the threshold of exclusion is
 24 33.33%. Khanna Decl., Ex. 2 ¶ 7. In other words, making the theoretical
 25 assumptions outlined above, Latinos must comprise 33.33% of the electorate in
 26 order for their preferred candidate to win an at-large seat without the support of
 27 non-Latino voters. Where the LCVAP of the entire city falls well below that
 28 threshold, and not accounting for the historic low turnout rates of Latinos in at-
 29 large elections, *see* Op. at 59, Defendants' creative attempt to maintain the at-
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1 large election system does not offer a complete remedy to the minority vote
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3 dilution in Yakima.

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5 Defendants' modifications to the current at-large system, moreover, do
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7 not address the barriers Latinos face running for at-large positions in terms of
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9 money and resources. *See* Op. at 62 (“[I]t can hardly be disputed that
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11 depressed socio-economic conditions have at least *some* detrimental effect on
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13 participation in the political process.”); *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 69-
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15 70 (1986) (“Courts and commentators have recognized . . . that candidates
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17 generally must spend more money in order to win election in a multimember
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19 district than in a single-member district.”). Single-member districts are the
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21 preferred remedy under Section 2 because of the benefits that smaller districts
22
23 afford minority communities. *See Buchanan*, 683 F. Supp. at 1542 (“These six
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25 small districts would be advantageous to black candidates because the expense
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27 of mounting a campaign throughout a large area would be decreased.”).

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29 In sum, Defendants' at-large proposal requires a host of assumptions to
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31 conclude that Latinos might have a shot at attaining one of the seats. Indeed,
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33 this scheme appears untested in Washington, *see* Mike Faulk, *Yakima, ACLU*
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35 *voting district plans remain far apart*, Yakima Herald Republic, Oct. 1, 2014,
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37 available at [http://www.yakimaherald.com/home/2540870-8/yakima-aclu-](http://www.yakimaherald.com/home/2540870-8/yakima-aclu-voting-district-plans-remain-far-apart)
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39 [voting-district-plans-remain-far-apart](http://www.yakimaherald.com/home/2540870-8/yakima-aclu-voting-district-plans-remain-far-apart) (Defendants stating “no other city in the
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41 state has such a system”), indicating that adoption of the plan would be in
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43 tension with state policy governing local election systems, and at best that it
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would prove an experiment in minority vote dilution.² Unlike Defendants' at-large proposal, a single-member district plan requires no guessing games to determine whether Latinos in Yakima will have an effective opportunity to participate in the political process.

3. Defendants' Five-District Proposal Dilutes Latino Voting Strength.

Finally, Defendants' proposal that the City be divided into five rather than seven districts further dilutes Latino voting strength, as it deprives Latinos of an additional opportunity district.

Plaintiffs' Illustrative Plan 1 demonstrates that a seven-district plan allows Latinos to have effective voter majorities in not one, but two districts. As discussed in Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motion, ECF No. 64 at 13-14, both Districts 1 and 2 in Illustrative Plan 1 include Latino registered voter majorities. *See also* Khanna Decl., Ex. 1. Courts routinely look to the registered voter population in ordering remedial plans. *See, e.g., Dickinson v. Ind. State Election Bd.*, 933 F.2d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The court may consider, at the remedial stage, what type of remedy is possible based on the factors traditionally examined in single-member districts, such as minority

² Plaintiffs are aware of no jurisdiction in Washington that employs a limited voting system for the deciding election, as Defendants propose here. Yakima's existing election scheme uses a primary system under which the top two candidates for specific positions advance to the general election, but the deciding election is then a head-to-head matchup between two candidates.

1 voter registration and turn-out rates.”); *see also* ECF No. 66-1 at 73 (Dr. Alford
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3 testifying that “a registered voter majority is probably a better indicator of
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5 having a majority district than is the CVAP number”).

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7 Defendants’ five-district proposal, however, does not include a second
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9 district in which Latinos would have a fair opportunity to elect their candidates
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11 of choice. Creating five larger districts requires inclusion of a greater number
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13 of Latino voters in District 1 to create a majority-minority district, thereby
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15 diluting Latino voting strength in surrounding areas. As a result, while
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17 Plaintiffs’ District 2 includes an LCVAP of 46.31%, Defendants’ District 5 has
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19 an LCVAP of only 34.84%. Khanna Decl., Ex. 3 (Third Supplemental Cooper
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21 Report) ¶ 10. More telling, while Latinos comprise a 53.35% majority of
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23 registered voters in Plaintiffs’ District 2, they comprise a mere 32.98% of
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25 registered voters in Defendants’ District 5. *Id.* ¶ 11. Thus, while Plaintiffs’
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27 plan provides an opportunity for Latinos to elect their candidates of choice in
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29 two out of seven districts, Defendants’ plan “would likely limit Latinos to a
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31 single seat on the Yakima City Council for many years to come.” *Id.* ¶ 13.

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33 Indeed, Defendants’ failure to provide Latino opportunity districts in
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35 proportion to the Latino eligible voter population further evinces why their
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37 plan does not pass muster under Section 2. While Section 2 does not
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39 “establish[] a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
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41 equal to their proportion in the population,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), the Supreme
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43 Court has held that “proportionality” in the relationship between “the number
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45 of majority-minority voting districts” and “minority members’ share of the
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47 relevant population” is relevant to a Section 2 analysis. *Johnson v. DeGrandy*,

1 512 U.S. 997, 1014 n.11 (1994); *see also id.* at 1000 (noting proportionality as
 2 relevant to the totality of circumstances). In other words, where there is a
 3 disparity between the minority population and the number of minority
 4 opportunity districts, that imbalance is probative evidence of a Section 2
 5 violation.³ *See Osceola Cnty.*, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1256 (rejecting defendants’
 6 proposed remedy where the plaintiff’s plan would provide Latinos “a
 7 reasonable opportunity to elect one out of five members of the Board (20%)”
 8 but “that opportunity is diluted” in the County’s plan “to one out of seven
 9 (14%)”); *see also id.* (discussing evidence that with a board of seven members,
 10 the Hispanic community should have an opportunity to elect two board
 11 members (28%)).
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22 Defendants’ proposal fails the proportionality analysis. Under
 23 Defendants’ plan, Latinos would have a reasonable opportunity at just one seat
 24 out of seven (14.29%). By contrast, Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plan 1 creates two
 25 districts in which Latinos comprise effective voter majorities, giving Latino
 26 voters an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in two out of seven
 27 seats (28.57%). Where the most recent available data indicates that Latinos
 28 comprise 26.54% of the citizen voting age population and 37.67% of the total
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 43 ³ The Supreme Court has left open whether the appropriate measure of
 44 proportionality in this sense is the minority group’s total population or eligible
 45 voter population. *Johnson*, 512 U.S. at 1017 n.14, 1021 n.18.
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1 citizen population, Khanna Decl., Ex. 3 ¶ 3, Defendants’ remedial plan fails to
 2 effectively capture the voting strength of this minority group.⁴
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4 Defendants are no strangers to the merits of having a second Latino
 5 opportunity district. In a recent public statement, they referred to their
 6 proposed District 5 as an “influence district” that “could potentially grow to be
 7 Latino majority as well over time.” See Mike Faulk, *Yakima, ACLU voting*
 8 *district plans remain far apart*, Yakima Herald Republic, Oct. 1, 2014,
 9 available at [http://www.yakimaherald.com/home/2540870-8/yakima-aclu-](http://www.yakimaherald.com/home/2540870-8/yakima-aclu-voting-district-plans-remain-far-apart)
 10 [voting-district-plans-remain-far-apart](http://www.yakimaherald.com/home/2540870-8/yakima-aclu-voting-district-plans-remain-far-apart). Defendants’ recognition of the benefits
 11 of allowing multiple Latino opportunity districts only underscores the flaws in
 12 their own plan. Rather than providing Latinos that opportunity *now*,
 13 commensurate with the current size of the Latino population and the Section 2
 14 violation that community has long endured, Defendants ask Latinos to wait
 15 *several more years* for full and fair participation in the political process. This
 16 wait-and-see approach is entirely unnecessary—and violates Section 2—where
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 35 ⁴ In fact, in another case in which the defendants had proposed a 5-2 voting
 36 plan, Defendants’ expert Dr. Alford attested that “[t]he most obvious way that
 37 Plaintiffs could demonstrate that a seven single member district plan might be
 38 superior for Hispanic representation to the five single member district plan,
 39 would be to show that the seven member plan would offer an increase in the
 40 number of districts expected to elect Hispanic candidates of choice.” Khanna
 41 Decl., Ex. 4 at 8. Here, Plaintiffs have demonstrated just that.
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1 Latinos can have the opportunity to elect their candidates of choice in two of
 2 out seven districts today.⁵
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5 **B. The Court Should Adopt Plaintiffs' Illustrative Plan 1.**

6 For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should reject Defendants'
 7 proposed remedial plan and adopt its own. In so doing, the Court is governed
 8 by the "longstanding general rule that single-member districts are to be used in
 9 judicially crafted redistricting plans." *Citizens for Good Gov't v. City of*
 10 *Quitman, Miss.*, 148 F.3d 472, 476 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing *Connor v. Finch*, 431
 11 U.S. 407, 415 (1977)); *see also Wise*, 437 U.S. at 540 ("[A] court-drawn plan
 12 should prefer single-member districts over multimember districts, absent
 13 persuasive justification to the contrary."). This requirement reflects
 14 recognition that "the practice of multimember districting can contribute to
 15 voter confusion, make legislative representatives more remote from their
 16 constituents, and tend to submerge electoral minorities and overrepresent
 17 electoral majorities." *Connor*, 431 U.S. at 415. Accordingly, unless the Court
 18 can articulate a "singular combination of unique factors" that justifies
 19 abandonment of this clear preference, *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U.S. 315, 333
 20 (1973), the Court must impose single-member districts. *See also Corder v.*
 21 *Kirksey*, 639 F.2d 1191, 1195 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he unique or special
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 41 ⁵ To the extent Defendants contend that their proposed District 5 might reach
 42 majority-minority status by 2020 or later, they ignore that the City is required
 43 to change district lines upon each decennial census, pushing the mirage of
 44 minority voting opportunity further into the future.
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1 circumstances allowing for a court-fashioned election scheme incorporating an
 2 at-large element [are] circumstances encompassing the rare, the exceptional,
 3 not the usual and diurnal.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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 6 Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plan 1 provides a full and complete remedy to the
 7 City of Yakima’s Section 2 violation. First, it encompasses seven single-
 8 member districts, in accordance with the rules governing judicial districting
 9 plans. Second, as noted above, Illustrative Plan 1 provides not one, but two
 10 Latino opportunity districts, consistent with Latinos’ share of the voting
 11 population and Supreme Court precedent. Third, the Court has already
 12 indicated that Illustrative Plan 1 meets the “compactness” requirement of
 13 *Gingles* 1, Op. at 21-23, which incorporates consideration of traditional
 14 districting principles, *id.* at 27; *see also* ECF No. 64 at 17-18. Indeed,
 15 Plaintiffs first provided Illustrative Plan 1 and its underlying data to
 16 Defendants in February 2013, *see* ECF No. 66-1 at 123-24, and Defendants
 17 have offered no practical objection on the record, even though they understood
 18 that plan would likely be offered as a remedy, *see* ECF Nos. 67 at 7, 85 at 11.
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21 Accordingly, Plaintiffs submit that the Court should adopt Illustrative
 22 Plan 1 as the Court-ordered remedy for the Yakima’s Section 2 violation.⁶
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⁶ Courts frequently adopt plaintiffs’ proposed plans as their own as remedies for Section 2 violations. *See, e.g., Large*, 670 F.3d at 1136, 1148 (affirming district court’s “reject[ion] [of] the Board’s proposal in favor of a plan with five single-member districts, as initially proposed by the Appellees”); *Harvell*, 126 F.3d at 1042 (affirming district court’s adoption of plaintiffs’ plan); *Dallas*

C. The Court Should Immediately Implement the Remedial Map.

Finally, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court should implement the remedial map in advance of the upcoming 2015 City Council election. Specifically, the Court should order that all seven City Council positions will appear on the 2015 ballot. An effective remedy requires prompt implementation. *See Desena v. Maine*, 793 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462 (D. Me. 2011) (“Constitutional violations, once apparent, should not be permitted to fester; they should be cured at the earliest practicable date.”). In fact, it is not uncommon for courts to order immediate special elections to ensure compliance with Section 2 upon finding a violation. *See Neal v. Harris*, 837 F.2d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 1987) (“The special election . . . is not a distinct remedy. It is merely a vehicle for the immediate implementation of the remedy provided in the court’s decree.”); *Clark v. Roemer*, 777 F. Supp. 471, 484 (M.D. La. 1991) (“[T]his Court and other District Courts have found that where a governing body has been elected under . . . an election scheme such as at-large elections, cancelling out the voting strength of a cognizable portion of the populace, thus denying them access to the political process, prompt new

Cnty. Comm’n, 850 F.2d at 1443 (directing district court to adopt plaintiffs’ plan); *Osceola Cnty.*, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 1256 (approving “United States’ Proposed Remedial Plan 2”); *Dillard*, 649 F. Supp. at 298 (requiring implementation of plaintiffs’ plan); *see also LULAC*, 648 F. Supp. at 598 (adopting two minority districts as drawn by plaintiffs and allowing defendants “to draw the remaining single-member district lines”).

1 elections are appropriate.’”) (quoting *Wallace v. House*, 377 F. Supp. 1192,
 2 1201 (W.D. La. 1974)).

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 4 As the Court found, Latinos did not have an equal opportunity to elect
 5 the current councilmembers elected under the existing system (almost all of
 6 whom have been on the City Council more than five years). A lengthy process
 7 of implementing single-member districts will perpetuate that unlawful system.
 8 And if all council seats are not up for election in 2015, Yakima voters will be
 9 confronted with a hodgepodge of a transitional system that will likely confuse
 10 voters and require some voters to wait years to elect a councilmember from
 11 their particular geographic district.
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20 The City currently uses “staggered terms” for City Council positions. If
 21 Plaintiffs’ Illustrative Plan 1 is implemented, Plaintiffs have no objections to
 22 the City continuing this electoral practice. Preservation of the staggered term
 23 system is simple to accomplish, and how to do so is delineated by state law.
 24 For cities using a council-manager form of government, such as Yakima, City
 25 Council positions are elected for four-year terms “[e]xcept for the initial
 26 staggering of terms.” RCW 35.18.020(2). That is, the first election run under
 27 a new voting system can utilize less than four-year terms to accomplish the
 28 staggering of terms.
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38 Here, Plaintiffs propose that the Court would accomplish “the initial
 39 staggering of terms” by ordering that all City Council positions be up for
 40 election in 2015. Four positions would be elected to a four-year term of office.
 41 Three positions would be elected to a two-year term of office, and would be up
 42 for reelection in 2017, this time for a four-year term. For the sake of
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1 administrative ease, Plaintiffs' proposed injunction would have odd-numbered
 2 and even-numbered positions designated for an initial four-year and two-year
 3 term, respectively.⁷ This is consistent with the initial staggering of terms that
 4 is mandated by state law when a reorganization is adopted pursuant to statutory
 5 processes. *See* RCW 35A.02.050.
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10 IV. CONCLUSION

11 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
 12 Court reject Defendants' proposed remedy and adopt Plaintiffs' proposed
 13 remedial plan and injunction.
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18 DATED: October 3, 2014

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 33 ⁷ Other ways of accomplishing the initial staggering of terms are possible, such
 34 as giving primary consideration to the residences or current terms of sitting
 35 councilmembers, or the geographic dispersion of seats. Plaintiffs believe that a
 36 neutral odds/evens method of staggering seats is sensible and easy to
 37 administer, but are open to alternatives, including a renumbering of districts in
 38 Illustrative Plan 1. Because the parties disagreed as to the fundamental issue of
 39 whether all seats should be up for a vote in 2015, they were not able to reach
 40 the ancillary issue of how to accomplish an initial staggering of terms.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on October 3, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing
Motion for Entry of Plaintiffs' Proposed Remedial Plan and Final Injunction
with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send
notification of such filing to the following attorney(s) of record:

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I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED:

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MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PLS.'
PROPOSED REMEDIAL PLAN AND
INJUNCTION – 21

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